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The return performance and factor sensitivities of Canadian equity real estate 
investment trusts (E-REITs) are examined. Today, typical and average 
Canadian E-REIT IPOs are correctly priced based on first-day and 
subsequent short-run returns. The overpricing evident earlier in the 1993-96 
period for typical and average E-REIT IPOs has corrected. E-REITs are 
equity investments with about one-half the market risk, and greater sensitivity 
to interest-rate changes, than the S&P/TSX Composite Index. E-REITs 
outperformed the S&P/TSX Composite over the 1996-2004 period on a return, 
risk, and market- and/or risk-adjusted basis. Thus, E-REITs provided material 
diversification benefits with no sacrifice in return, when added to a common 
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Introduction 
 
While REITs have been a popular asset class for investment in the U.S. since 
the 1960s, the first Canadian REIT was created in August 1993, when 
RealFund was converted from an open- into a closed-end fund structure. The 
average market capitalization of REITs has more than doubled over the past 
five years to about $1.2 billion. According to Standard & Poor’s Inc. (S&P), 
the 26 REITs trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) had a total 
market capitalization of $17.4 billion at the beginning of 2005. The REIT 
sector represented about 13% of the $137 billion income trust market, which 
itself accounted for 11 percent of Canada’s total market capitalization. Thus, 
REITs represented about one percent of the value of the TSX. Despite the 
relatively small size of the REIT market, S&P generally gives REITs a better 
rating on its stability-rating chart than the majority of the other income trusts. 




Of the 29 equity REITs (E-REITs) that have entered the Canadian market 
since 1993, 25 were created through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and 
four were reorganized from existing open-end funds into REITs. This 
number is reduced to 26 by the acquisitions of RealFund by Riocan in 
February 1999, Avista by Summit in November 1999, and CPL by 
Retirement Residencies in April 2002. Although the international evidence 
(particularly in the U.S.) finds that the IPOs of operating firms are 
underpriced for most countries,
2 most previous studies do not find a similar 
first-day price increase for U.S. REIT IPOs. The evidence on U.S. REITs is 
mixed depending upon time period and test methodology, and varies from 
significant negative to significant positive first-day returns. 
 
In the literature, the after-market performances of REITs are examined 
primarily from a U.S. context. Overall, the empirical evidence shows that the 
post-IPO return performance of U.S. REITs varies from significant negative 
to significant positive first-day returns depending upon the methodology 
used and the time period studied, and that the long-run, market- and risk-
adjusted performance of U.S. REITs is comparable to that of the market.  
 
Canadian REITs provide an alternative laboratory for testing the robustness 
of U.S. findings for REITs since Canadian REITs differ from U.S. REITs in 
terms of legal structure, retail investor involvement, actual distributions and 
distributions required to maintain tax-free status. Canadian REITs operate 
                                                 
1 This rating assesses cash-flow stability and indicates payout sustainability. 
2 For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) report that the average first-day return for common 
stock IPOs in the U.S. is 18.8% between 1980 and 2001. The initial mean return for the IPOs of 
Canadian operating firms is among the lowest for the many countries reported on the website of 
Jay Ritter, which is available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Int.pdf. Performance of Canadian E-REITs  3 
under a trust legal structure, subject to flow-through taxation rules, while 
U.S. REITs operate under a limited liability corporation structure.
3 The 
average Canadian REIT has a more retail-oriented shareholder base than its 
U.S. counterpart, although institutional investor representation is expected to 
grow in Canada with the inclusion of REITs in the S&P/TSX Composite 
Index. The average Canadian REIT distributes a higher proportion of its cash 
flows than its U.S. counterpart, as is discussed more fully in the next section.  
A Canadian REIT must distribute all of its income and capital gains annually 
after making appropriate designations to maintain a tax-free status, unlike its 
U.S. counterpart that only needs to distribute at least 90% of its taxable 
income.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The sample and its 
characteristics are discussed in section two. Section three presents and 
evaluates the after-market performance of E-REITs that begin public life 
with an IPO. The risk and return performance of E-REITs in the secondary 
market over the 1996-2004 period is reported and discussed in section four.  
The sensitivities of E-REIT returns to changes in equity market returns and 
interest rates are discussed and analyzed in section five. Section six 
concludes the paper.  
 
 
Sample and Sample Characteristics 
 
The initial sample of REITs consists of all REITs trading on the TSX during 
the 1996-2004 period based on a search of the TSX Monthly Review, 
SEDAR, CFMRC, Investcom and GlobeinvestorGold.  The sample is free of 
survivorship bias. Mortgage REITs (M-REITs), which commonly have at 
least 75% of their holdings in mortgages and short-term loans, are excluded 
from this initial sample. The remaining sample consists of equity REITs (E-
REITs), which are, by definition, at least 80% invested in real properties. 
 
Information (such as IPO date and gross proceeds) on the Canadian 
population of 24 E-REIT IPOs is obtained from the Financial Post New Issue, 
SDC Platinum, Investcom and Bloomberg databases. In the case of 
conflicting IPO dates, individual filings with SEDAR and press releases are 
relied upon. Individual E-REITs responded to our requests for information 
on whether they began life with an IPO or with a re-organization into a REIT 
structure. Price data for the first 250 trading days following the IPO are 
obtained from CFMRC.  
 
                                                 
3  The issue of limiting liability for unitholders of trusts was resolved in Ontario in 2005, 
following much earlier resolutions in Quebec and Alberta (CAIF, 2005). 4 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
Clauses in their Declarations of Trust state that the E-REITs will distribute at 
least their taxable incomes to their unitholders, to ensure a nontaxable status. 
The capital cost allowance (CCA) distributed to unitholders is taxed as 
capital gains with unit disposition, and all non-CCA-distributed income is 
taxed at the marginal tax rate of each unitholder.
4 
 
Summary statistics on the cross-sectional dividend payout, leverage and 
book-to-market ratios for a sample of Canadian E-REITs are reported in 
table 1. As expected, the median [mean] dividend payout ratios (dividends 
per share/earnings per share) reveal that a typical [average] REIT pays out 
120% [220%] of its EPS, with considerable cross-sectional variation. 
Because E-REIT portfolios consist mainly of properties with material CCA 
write-offs that reduce or shelter taxable income, the annual cash flows often 
exceed taxable income – making it possible for individual funds to pay out a 
percentage that exceeds taxable income.  
 
Table 1 reports various summary statistics for three ratios for the sample of 
E-REITs over the period 1996-2004. Leverage ratio is measured by the ratio 
of long-term debt to total capital. “Std. Dev.” refers to the standard deviation. 
The data are obtained from Bloomberg. “NA” refers to values not available 
in Bloomberg prior to 1999, for the dividend payout ratios. 
 
Table 1: Annual summary statistics for the dividend payout, leverage 
and book-to-market ratios for the E-REITs for 1996-2004 
Dividend Payout Ratio  Leverage Ratios  Book-to-market Ratios 
Year 
Median Mean Std.
Dev. Median Mean  Std.
Dev. Median Mean Std.
Dev.
1996 NA  NA NA 0.37 0.33  0.31 0.75 0.75 0.55
1997 NA  NA NA 0.43 0.40  0.23 0.80 0.74 0.24
1998 NA  NA NA 0.48 0.41  0.23 1.15 1.12 0.37
1999 1.05 -0.30 6.71 0.52  0.43  0.25 1.05  1.10 0.39
2000 1.08  1.81 2.31 0.60  0.61  0.04 0.92  1.02 0.36
2001 1.14  2.05 2.11 0.49  0.46  0.22 0.79  0.91 0.37
2002 1.16  5.18 15.81 0.51  0.45  0.23 0.94  0.97 0.33
2003 1.07  1.71 3.23 0.54  0.50  0.19 0.73  0.77 0.20
2004 1.69  2.77 4.34 0.56  0.48  0.20 0.69  0.79 0.44
1996- 
2004  1.20 2.20 5.75 0.50 0.45  0.21 0.83 0.91 0.35
 
 
The allowable degree of leverage, also, is specified in the Declaration of 
Trust of each E-REIT. A typical E-REIT has much less of a tax-shelter 
incentive for using debt since it pays out all or most of its income to 
                                                 
4 Because REITs are qualified investments for registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs), 
registered retirement income funds (RRIFs), registered education savings plans (RESPs) and 
deferred profit sharing plans (DPSPs), investors can take advantage of additional tax deferrals 
by investing in REITs through such plans. Performance of Canadian E-REITs  5 
unitholders.  Nevertheless, the leverage of the typical [average] E-REIT as 
measured by the long-term debt to total capital ratio is 50% [45%] over the 
examined period. 
 
The mean book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) is 0.91 over the entire 
period, and has only exceeded 1.0 during the 1997-99 period. This mean 
book-to-market ratio is comparable to the Canadian stock average of 0.96 
that Kortas, L’Her and Plante (2004) report for the 1988-2001 period.  
 
 




Although the international evidence (particularly in the U.S.) finds that the 
IPOs of operating firms are underpriced for most countries,
5 most previous 
studies do not find a similar first-day price increase for U.S. REIT IPOs. The 
evidence on U.S. REITs is mixed, depending upon time period and test 
methodology, and varies from significant negative to significant positive 
first-day returns. Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) report underperformance by 
E-REIT IPOs during first-day trading (2.82% price decline) and for the first 
190 trading days relative to seasoned E-REITs.  The authors attribute this 
performance to a higher number of speculative issues and less institutional 
participation in the IPOs of E-REITs versus operating firms. Below, Zaman 
and McIntosh (1995) find that any REIT IPO overpricing is removed when 
returns are based on the bid-ask mid-spread or the ask price. While this result 
is interesting, it ignores the trade costs that initial buyers of the IPOs would 
incur if they liquidated their positions during the first day of trading. 
Impatient sellers would sell at the bid and more patient sellers might be able 
to sell within the half-spread (i.e., between the inside bid and the bid-ask 
mid-spread). 
 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) find that the average first-day price gain is 3.5% 
and that REIT IPOs outperform a benchmark of seasoned E-REITs over the 
first 100 days of trading during the 1991-94 period. They attribute this post-
1980s result to increased institutional participation and more valuation 
uncertainty induced by greater active management of REITs. In contrast, for 
the 1976-95 period, Shelor and Anderson (1998) report negative average 
returns over the first 25 trading days, which turn significantly positive within 
180 days of the issue. Londerville (2002) reports under-pricing for 10 and 20 
days following issue, using cumulative market-adjusted returns for 13 
Canadian, TSX-listed REIT IPOs.  
                                                 
5 For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) report that the average first-day return for common 
stock IPOs in the U.S. is 18.8% between 1980 and 2001. 6 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
 
Chan, Erickson and Wang (2003) report that the average first-day returns are 
much lower for the IPOs of REITs versus those of industrial firms 
(respectively, -3.10% and 9% for the 1970-79 period, -3.14% and 15.30% 
for the 1980-89 period, and 2.36% and 21.44% for the 1990-2000 period).
6 
Similarly, Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005) report average first-day 
returns of 2.47% over the 1985-98 period, negative but not statistically 
significant first-day returns for the first of three waves of IPO issuance 
(1985), and positive and statistically significant first-day returns of 3.21% 
and 5.57% during the second (1993-94) and third (1997-98) waves of IPO 
issuance, respectively. Buttimer, et al. argue that the relatively lower under-
pricing of REIT IPOs may be due to the greater relative transparency of 
REITs because of greater valuation certainty attributable to their nature, and 
more stringent regulatory restrictions. However, the conjecture that REITs 
are more transparent or easier to value is open to some debate because the 
financial statements of a typical REIT, like those of a typical industrial firm, 
are prepared in accordance with generally-accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). Furthermore, unlike the case for industrial firms, the generally-
accepted or preferred measure of  REIT operating performance  is not net 
income. Instead, securities analysts, investors and other interested parties 
typically evaluate the performance of a REIT using Funds From Operations 




Hypotheses, a priori expectations and methodology 
 
The first null hypothesis tested in this section is 
1
0 H : The mean and median 
issue-to-open and issue-to-close returns for E-REIT IPOs for the first trading 
day are not significantly different from zero. 
 
Various rationales exist for the expectation that the mis-pricing of E-REIT 
IPOs should be lower than that for industrial IPOs. First, E-REIT IPOs are 
arguably more transparent and subject to less uncertainty, on average, than 
industrial IPOs because an E-REIT, on average, holds a better-diversified 
portfolio of assets than its industrial counterpart. The secondary market for 
the assets held by an E-REIT IPO also is more active and developed than the 
secondary market for the assets held by an industrial IPO (Buttimer, Hyland 
and Sanders, 2005; Londerville, 2002). Second, the average E-REIT IPO is 
                                                 
6 For instance, Helwege and Liang (2003) report average first-day returns of between 17% and 
30.6% for industrial IPOs for the 1975-2000 period. 
7 This measure also is commonly referred to as cash flow from operations or distributable 
income. Furthermore, S&P reports wide disparities in the calculation and reporting of 
distributable income based on an examination of the financial statements of 40 unnamed income 
trusts. These funds used 19 names for distributable income, and 20% of these funds overstated 
distributable cash by an average of 22% (Langton, 2006). Performance of Canadian E-REITs  7 
more focused than its industrial counterpart because the holdings of REITs 
are constrained by regulation to be primarily in real estate in both the U.S. 
and Canada. For example, the Canadian Income Tax Act requires that 
Canadian REITs have at least 80% of their property invested in real property, 
and interests in real property, located in Canada. Third, the principal-agent 
problem associated with free-cash-flows should be lower for an average E-
REIT IPO compared to its industrial counterpart since E-REITs in both the 
U.S. and Canada are required to distribute most of their cash flows to their 
unitholders or shareholders. Fourth, direct investment in real estate, and, 
especially, obtaining a portfolio of sufficient size to achieve the benefits of 
diversification, is either not feasible due to capital constraints, or is quite 
costly for individual investors and smaller institutional investors. As a result, 
it seems likely that these investors require little or no price concession on an 
E-REIT IPO to achieve the diversification benefits offered by this 
investment, especially when real estate as an investment asset class has 
grown in importance.
8 In contrast, direct investment in a reasonably-well-
diversified portfolio of publicly-traded, industrial, firms is achievable with 
little capital – and at a relatively low cost – for example, by purchasing one 
of the many ETFs (Exchange Trade Fund) that trade on one of the exchanges 
in Canada and the U.S.  
 
However, there could still be some under-pricing associated with E-REITs. 
Given their low retention rates of cash-flow and accrual earnings, E-REITs 
expecting to realize future growth opportunities at least partially funded by 
external equity financing may intentionally under-price their IPOs so that 
their subsequent season equity offerings (SEOs) are well received by the 
market (Welch, 1989). 
 
Furthermore, we can reasonably expect that any under-pricing of E-REIT 
IPOs will be lower in Canada than in the U.S. First, Canadian E-REITs 
potentially have lower agency problems associated with free-cash-flows 
since they must distribute at least their taxable income, while their U.S. 
counterparts must distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable income as 
dividends. Furthermore, actual payouts for an average Canadian REIT, as 
reported in the previous section, greatly exceed those for their U.S. 
counterparts, which were 65.2% in 2001 and 72% in 2004.
9 Second,  the 
different clientele mixes of retail and institutional investors for E-REITs with 
a greater retail proportion in Canada should lead to lower under-pricing (if 
any) in Canada, as these investors attempt to achieve the diversification 
benefits from real estate investment. Whether Canadian E-REITs have a 
                                                 
8 To illustrate, the relative weight of real estate in the portfolios of Canadian pension funds 
varied between 3.4 and 4.2 and averaged 3.85% over the 1990-1999 period, and varied between 
5.2% and 7.1% and averaged 6.2% over the more recent 2000-04 period. 
9   The U.S. numbers are drawn from the NAREIT website, which is available at: 
http://www.nareit.com/portfoliomag/05mayjun/feat1.shtml. 8 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
greater incentive than their U.S. counterparts to under-price their IPOs to 
facilitate further SEOs is unclear. While Canadian REITs have lower 
retention of cash-flow and accrual earnings, and do access the SEO market 
often, it is unknown whether this exceeds such access by their U.S. 
counterparts. 
 
The second null hypothesis tested in this section is 
2
0 H : The mean 
benchmark-adjusted return performances for E-REIT IPOs for periods of up 
to one year post-issue are not significantly different from zero. Given market 
efficiency, our expectation is that the short-run post-IPO performance of E-
REIT IPOs in Canada will not be superior on a risk- and market-return-
adjusted basis. 
 
To test the above two hypotheses, the first-day and subsequent short-run 
return performances are examined for un-weighted (i.e., implicit equal-) and 
issue-size-weighted samples of the 24 REIT IPOs. 
10 Average compound 
daily returns (not) adjusted by the market return are tested for post-IPO 
trading periods of 5, 10, 21, 63, 125, 188 and 250 trading days (i.e., for 
calendar periods of approximately 1 and 2 weeks, and 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 
months, respectively). The means and medians of the returns for the various 
post-IPO trading periods are tested using t- and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. 
To examine the time-period sensitivity of the findings for the first-day 
returns, the sample of 24 REIT IPOs is further subdivided into two six-year 




The mean and median market-(not)adjusted first-day returns for the two 
sample weightings are reported in table 2. For the full period, the mean first-
day equal-weighted returns are significant and negative (approximately -11% 
to -12%). Median first-day returns, which are less sensitive to outliers, are 
substantially smaller (about 1% or less in magnitude) than their mean 
counterparts, and are only significant for the issue- to- open period when not 
market-adjusted. The mean first-day size-weighted returns are also 
significant, but marginally more negative than their equal-weighted 
counterparts.  
 
Table 2 reports the issue-to-open and issue-to-close, first-day, returns (not) 
adjusted by market returns for equal and size-weighted samples of the 
Canadian E-REIT IPOs over the 1993-2004 period and two sub-periods. 
Equal-weighted (E-W) refers to using the same weight for each IPO in the 
calculation of the mean and standard deviation. Size-weighted (S-W) refers 
                                                 
10 One REIT (Summit) without a full year of post-IPO data at the time of data collection was 
excluded from the sample. Performance of Canadian E-REITs  9 
to using a weight for each IPO in the calculation of the mean and standard 
deviation that is equal to the relative size of the IPO, in terms of dollar 
proceeds. The median, minimum and maximum values are based on the un-
weighted (or same-weighted) returns. The t-test for the mean size-weighted 
returns is computed based on the Eckbo and Norli (2005) methodology.  *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a t-test for the mean differences and a Wilcoxon test for 
median differences. N is the sample size. 
 
Table 2: First-day returns for IPOs of Canadian E-REITs 
Not market-adjusted  Market-adjusted 








Full period 1993-2004 (N = 24) 





StdDev E-W 0.1891  0.1967  0.1920  0.1996 





StdDev S-W 0.1910  0.1988  0.1939  0.2018 
Median -0.0104
** -0.0050  -0.0098
* -0.0084 
Minimum -0.4200  -0.4100  -0.4282  -0.4182 
Maximum 0.1020  0.1700  0.1039  0.1719 
First sub-period 1993-1998 (N = 12) 





StdDev E-W 0.2061  0.2094  0.2095  0.2127 











Minimum -0.4200  -0.4100  -0.4282  -0.4182 
Maximum 0.1000  0.1000  0.0960  0.0960 
Second sub-period 1999-2004 (N = 12) 
Mean E-W  -0.0221  -0.0110  -0.0227  -0.0117 
StdDev E-W 0.1162  0.1238  0.1185  0.1261 
Mean S-W  -0.0175  -0.0061  -0.0172  -0.0058 
StdDev S-W 0.1149  0.1248  0.1170  0.1270 
Median -0.0025  -0.0010  -0.0021  0.0009 
Minimum -0.3750  -0.3700  -0.3805  -0.3755 
Maximum 0.1020  0.1700  0.1039  0.1719 
 
The sub-period results show that mean (and median) mis-pricing occurs in 
the first and not the second sub-period. While none of the mean and median 
first-day returns are significantly different from zero in the second sub-
period, all of the mean and median first-day returns in the first sub-period are 10 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
negative and significant.  As for the full time period, the mean equal-
weighted first-day returns are less [more] negative than their corresponding 
size-weighted counterparts in the first [second] sub-period. This implies that 
the overpricing evident for E-REIT IPOs in the earlier sub-period has 
corrected, and E-REIT IPOs are correctly priced during the more recent sub-
period, on average. 
 
Mean average daily compound equal- and size-weighted E-REIT returns (not) 
adjusted for market returns for post-IPO periods of one week through one 
year are reported in table 3. The equal-weighted and not market-adjusted 
average daily compound returns are slightly positive and statistically 
significant for all but two of the time periods considered (the first week and 
9 months) based on the mean, and for all but three post-IPO periods (week 1, 
and 3 and 9 months) based on the median. In contrast, the equal-weighted 
and market-adjusted average compound daily mean and median returns are 
not statistically significant, except for the first three months post-IPO (0.08% 
and 0.13%, respectively) and the first 6 months (median only at 0.31%). 
 
Table 3 reports the average daily compound returns for the sample of 24 
Canadian E-REITs for post-IPO periods of approximately 1 and 2 weeks, 
and 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months.  
 
Table 3: Average daily compound returns for the Canadian E-REITs for 
various post-IPO periods 















Median Min.  Max. 
No 0.0018  0.0059 0.0028
** 0.0049 0.0012 -0.0100 0.0160  1 




** -0.0060 0.0112  2 
weeks Yes 0.0013  0.0053 0.0020




*** -0.0052 0.0069  1 
month  Yes 0.0011  0.0033 0.0011
















** -0.0111 0.0329 
No 0.0006
* 0.0014 0.0004 0.0012 0.0007
* -0.0018 0.0055  9 
months Yes  0.0003  0.0014 0.0001  0.0013 0.0002  -0.0021 0.0049 
No 0.0007
** 0.0016 0.0004 0.0015 0.0009
** -0.0026 0.0045  12 
months Yes  0.0004  0.0014 0.0003  0.0012 0.0003  -0.0023 0.0035 
 
The returns are (not) adjusted for market returns. Equal-weighted (E-W) 
refers to using the same weight for each IPO in the calculation of the mean 
and standard deviation. Size-weighted (S-W) refers to using a weight for 
each IPO in the calculation of the mean and standard deviation that is equal 
to the relative size of the IPO, in terms of dollar proceeds of the issue. The 
median, minimum (min.) and maximum (max.) are based on the un-weighted Performance of Canadian E-REITs  11 
(or same-weighted) returns. The t-test for the size-weighted returns is 
computed based on the Eckbo and Norli (2005) methodology.  *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a t-test for the mean differences and a Wilcoxon test for median 
differences. 
 
The mean size-weighted average compound daily returns generally are 
significantly different from zero only when they are not market-adjusted. 
The only mean size-weighted and market-adjusted average compound daily 
return that is significant is the return of 0.07% for the 3-month period post-
IPO.  
 
Thus, both the mean and median average compound daily returns, after 
being market-adjusted, are (with few exceptions) not significantly different 
over longer post-issue measurement periods. Thus, the empirical evidence 
supports the first and second null hypotheses – that Canadian E-REIT IPOs 








The empirical evidence finds that the return performance of REITs in the 
secondary market is comparable to that of other equities, on average, but can 
be better or worse depending upon the time period considered. Smith and 
Shulman (1976) report that REITs outperformed [underperformed] the S&P 
index over the 1963-73 [1963-74] period. Kuhle, Walther and Wurtzebach 
(1986) find that REITs outperformed [underperformed] the S&P index over 
the 1977-84 [1973-76] periods. Titman and Warga (1986) report that the 
risk-adjusted return performance of REITs is not statistically different from 
that of the market for the 1973-82 period. Goebel and Kim (1989) report that 
REITs underperformed the S&P index over the 1984-87 period. Han and 
Liang (1995) report that an equal-weighted E-REIT portfolio 
underperformed the market for the 1970-75 and 1988-93 sub-periods and 
outperformed for the 1976-81 and 1982-87 sub-periods, and that the value-
weighted REIT portfolio only underperformed over the 1970-75 sub-period. 
 
Chen and Peiser (1999) find that REITs underperformed [in-line performed] 
the S&P 500 on a non-risk- [risk-] adjusted return basis for the 1993-97 
period. Sanders (1998) finds that REITs underperformed the market on a 
                                                 
11 The inferences are not materially affected if the conversions to E-REITs are included in the 
E-REIT IPO sample. 12 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
risk-adjusted basis over the 1978-96 period, but outperformed over two five-
year sub-periods included therein (1978-86 and 1990-96). 
 
Hypothesis, a priori expectations and methodology 
 
Equal- and value-weighed portfolios of all REITs are constructed at a 
monthly frequency for the 1996-2004 period. Since the equal- and value-
weighted portfolios place relatively more weight on smaller and larger E-
REITs, respectively, they can be used to draw inferences about the relative 
performances of REITs based on cap size. 
 
The market- and risk-adjusted performances of the two types of E-REIT 
portfolios or indexes are assessed using Jensen’s alpha,  i α , which is 
obtained by estimating: 
,, ,, , () ( ) it ft i i m t ft it rr r r α βε −= + −+                                                   (1) 
where  , it r is the return on the E-REIT index i for month t after adjusting for 
stock splits from CFMRC;  , ft r   is the risk-free rate of return for month t 
based on the 91-day T-Bill rate from CFMRC;  , mt r is the rate of return on the 
market (i.e., S&P/TSX total return index in CFMRC) for month t;  i β  is the 
beta coefficient or sensitivity of the rate of return on E-REIT index i with the 
market m; and  , it ε  is the error term with the usually-assumed properties. As 
a test of robustness, the market-adjusted and not the risk-adjusted 
performance of the two types of E-REIT portfolios also are examined. 
 
The null hypothesis tested is this section of the paper is 
3
0 H : The market- and 
(non)risk-adjusted E-REIT performance, as captured by alpha, is not 
significantly different from zero. Significantly positive [negative] alphas 
indicate superior [inferior] performance for the E-REITs on a market- and 
(non)risk-adjusted basis. Our expectation, based on the U.S. findings, is that 
no significant abnormal returns are expected over the longer term in the post-




The mean monthly [excess] returns for the equal- and value-weighted E-
REIT indexes are statistically significant at 2.11% and 2.15% [1.80% and 
1.84%], respectively, which exceeds their insignificant counterparts of 
0.75% [0.44%] for the S&P/TSX Composite Index. However, the standard 
deviation of returns for the equal-weighted E-REIT index of 7.58% exceeds 
that of the value-weighted E-REIT index and S&P/TSX Composite Index 
(4.66% and 4.90%, respectively). The Sharpe ratios are higher for both E-Performance of Canadian E-REITs  13 
REIT indexes (0.237 and 0.396 for the equal- and value-weighted indexes, 
respectively) than for the market (0.090).
12 Based on table 4, the Jensen 
alpha estimates are equal, positive, and significant for both E-REIT portfolio 
weightings based on market-adjusted returns (1.35% and 1.41%, respectively) 
and on market- and risk-adjusted returns (1.57% and 1.63%, respectively). 
Thus, a portfolio tilted towards larger E-REITs outperforms one tilted 
towards smaller E-REITs, over the studied period, based on the Sharpe 
estimates. However, this difference essentially vanishes for a comparison 
based on the estimated Jensen alphas, due to differences in the systematic 
risks or betas of the two E-REIT portfolio weightings. 
 
Table 4 reports the Jensen alphas as a measure of performance for the equal- 
and value-weighted indexes of REITs. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a t-test for 
the mean differences. 
 
Table 4: Market- and risk-adjusted measures of performance for the E-
REIT Indexes 

















Beta   0.5181
***  0.4753
*** 
Adjusted R²    0.1032    0.2426 
 
The total risk of the equal-weighted E-REIT index was shown above to be 
much higher than its value-weighted counterpart (7.58% versus 4.66%). In 
contrast, the market risk (or beta) of the equal-weighted REIT index is closer 
in magnitude but still higher in value than that for the value-weighted E-
REIT index (0.5181 versus 0.4753), and both E-REIT indexes can be 
considered to be defensive in relation to the priced risk of the equity market. 
In addition, the two E-REIT indices have very high levels of non-market risk 
given the high values of one minus their adjusted R² values (0.8968 and 
0.7574 for the equal- and value-weighted index, respectively).  
 
Three inferences follow from these findings for the secondary market 
performance of Canadian E-REITs. First, a portfolio of Canadian E-REITs 
outperformed the Canadian equity market on a market- and risk-adjusted 
basis, over the studied period. Second, a portfolio of Canadian E-REITs was 
a defensive holding in terms of systematic equity market risk, over the 
studied period. Third, Canadian E-REITs provided good diversification 
                                                 
12 The Sharpe ratio, Sh, is given by  ifi Sh r r σ =− , where  i r is the return on the E-REIT index 
i;  f r is the risk-free return; and  i σ is the standard deviation of return for index i. 14 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
benefits over the studied period since their returns were driven primarily by 
non-equity-market risk factors. 
 
 
Sensitivity of E-REIT Returns to Equity Market Returns 




The evidence on the relation between the returns on U.S. REITs and interest 
rates is mixed. Gyourko and Keim (1992) report correlations of 0.43 and 
0.39 between daily REIT returns and long-bond interest-rate changes over 
the 1978-90 period. Buetow and Johnson (2001) report correlations between 
REIT prices [S&P 500] and long-term government bonds of 0.229 [0.389] 
and 0.183 [0.279] during periods of expansive and restrictive monetary 
policy, respectively, over the 1973-2000 period. Glascock, Lu and So (2000) 
find evidence that the diversification benefits provided by REITs have 
decreased, given that REIT returns are co-integrated with the bond market 
over the 1980-91 but not the 1992-96 period. 
 
Mueller and Pauley (1995) report that the returns of U.S. REITs are less 
interest-rate sensitive than the S&P 500 for the 1972-93 period, and that both 
asset classes are negatively related to short-, medium- and long-term 
interest-rate changes.  Similarly, Allen, Madura and Springer (2001) report 
coefficients of -0.432 and -0.334 for the returns of E- and non-E-REITs with 
long-term interest-rate changes for the 1992-96 period. He, Webb and Myer 
(2003) report similar results for seven interest-rate proxies and E-REIT and 
equity market excess returns for the 1972-98 period. 
 
Using a two-factor model, Sanders (1998) finds that the returns of REITs 
exhibit greater sensitivity than the S&P 500 to changes in the rates of long-
term government bonds (0.73 versus 0.88), and higher sensitivity to changes 
in a more risky interest-rate proxy  (0.77 versus 0.71), for the 1978-96 period. 
Using a three-factor model, Swanson, Theis and Casey (2002) report 
estimated coefficients that vary across sub-periods, and are 0.78, 0.22 and 
0.08 for the market premium, the maturity premium and credit risk premium, 
respectively, over the overall 1989-1998 period.
13 
 
Hypothesis and a priori expectations 
 
                                                 
13 The maturity premium is given by the spread between long-term and short-term bonds, and 
the credit risk premium is given by the spread between Baa bonds and the treasury-bill rate. Performance of Canadian E-REITs  15 
The hypothesis tested in this section of the paper is
4
0 H : The returns of E-
REITs are positively related with equity-market returns, and negatively 
related with changes in various interest rates.  
 
Because of their typically high payout ratios, E-REIT returns are expected to 
show high negative sensitivity to changes in interest rates. To test this 
hypothesis, changes in monthly interest rates are proxied by changes in the 
long-term (10-year) government bond rate, the corporate bond rate and the 
five-year mortgage rate.  
 
The correlations between the monthly returns for the E-REITs and the 
TSX/S&P Composite Index, both with each other and with each of the four 
interest-rate series, are reported in table 5. As expected, the two equity series 
are positively and significantly correlated, but the correlation is relatively 
low at 0.374. All the E-REIT correlations are negative, and significantly 
different from zero. Not surprisingly, the strongest negative correlation of -
0.42 is with corporate bond rates, followed by those with long-term and 10-
year government bond rates (-0.36 and -0.37, respectively). While the 
correlations between the returns on the equity market are similarly negative 
with all four interest-rate series, only the one with corporate bonds of -0.250 
is significantly different from zero. This suggests that E-REITs are more 
interest-rate sensitive than other equities. 
 
Table 5 reports the correlations between the monthly returns of the size-
weighted index of Canadian E-REITs, the S&P/TSX Composite Index and 
changes in four interest-rate series. “LT Gov.” refers to the average yield on 
a portfolio of 10+ year Government of Canada bonds from CFMRC. “10Y 
Gov.” refers to the yield on 10-year Government of Canada benchmark 
bonds, drawn from Baseline. “Corp.” refers to the average yield on a 
portfolio of high grade, long-term corporate bonds from CFMRC. “5-year 
Mort.” refers to the 5-year conventional mortgage rate from the Bank of 
Canada, as reported in CFMRC. “Short-term” refers to the 1-year treasury-
bill rate, drawn from the Bank of Canada website. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based 
on a t-test. 
 
Table 5:  Correlations between monthly returns of E-REITs, S&P/TSX 
Composite and changes in four interest rate series 
Bond rate  S&P/TSX 
Composite Index Return 
Series 











Composite  -0.1258 -0.1357  -0.2502
*** -0.1095  
 16 Kryzanowski and Tcherednitchenko 
According to Allen, Madura and Springer (2001), the determinants of the 
returns on REITs are better assessed using a multifactor model. The model 
should contain  the market proxy, as well as proxies for short-term interest 
rates, to capture the effect of changes in the cost of capital, and long-term 
interest rates, to capture the market expectations of future interest rates. To 
this end, a three-factor model is estimated where the E-REIT returns are 
regressed on the equity-market proxy (S&P/TSX Composite Total Return 
Index); the short-term interest-rate proxy (1-year Canadian T-bills); and, a 
long-term proxy (either the Canadian government long-term bond rate series 
or its 10-year counterpart). Because all interest-rate series are highly 




The R-square values for both long-term interest-rate versions of this model, 
which are reported in table 6, are reasonable at 0.27 (using the long-term 
government bond rate) and 0.24 (using the 10-year government bond rate).  
The estimated coefficient for the short-term interest rate proxy is slightly 
negative and statistically significant for the model with the long-term 
government bond rate only.  While the estimated coefficients for both long-
term bond rate proxies are significant, the estimated coefficient for the long-
term government bond rate is positive (0.09) and that for the 10-year 
government bond rate is negative (-0.04), and is probably due to the different 
durations of these two long-term interest-rate series. As expected, the 
estimated coefficient for the orthogonalized equity-market proxy is 




Table 6 presents some summary statistics for a three-factor model for the 
monthly returns on the Canadian value-weighted index of E-REITs. The 
factors are the monthly rates on one-year T-Bills (1-yr T-bills), the monthly 
rates on long-term (LT) or 10-year (10-yr) government bonds (Gov. Bonds) 
and the monthly orthogonalized equity-market return (Orth. EMR). The 
equity-market return is orthogonalized to remove the impact of the other two 
factors. The definition and the source of the data for the various interest-rate 
series are as reported in table 5. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a t-test.  
 
                                                 
14 The process of orthogonalization involves, for example, regressing an independent variable 
against another independent variable and then using the residuals from the regression instead of 
actual returns or rates for this independent variable in the basic regression relationship. 
15 These results are consistent with those for various simple regressions between the E-REIT 
returns and each individual interest-rate series.   All of the estimated betas are significant and 
they are positive [negative] for the equity market [each interest-rate series]. The most negative 
coefficient estimate of -0.08 occurs for the corporate bond-rate series.  Performance of Canadian E-REITs  17 
Table 6: Summary results for regressions of the returns on the value-
weighted E-REIT index based on a three-factor model 
Regression Independent  Variables  Coefficient Adjusted  R-square 
1-yr T-bills  -0.0113
*   
LT Gov. Bonds  0.0896
***  1 
Orth. EMR  0.0345
*** 
0.2705 
1-yr T-bills  -0.0104 
10-yr Gov. Bonds  -0.0405
***  2 




Sanders (1998) and Swanson, et al. (2002) propose regressing excess REIT 
returns on the term premium (i.e., rate spread between long-term government 
bonds and T-bills) and the default premium (i.e., rate spread between high-
yield or Baa corporate bonds and long-term government bonds). Since the 
Canadian bond market is much less developed compared to the U.S. market, 
no high-yield corporate bond series exists for the full period examined herein. 
Therefore, we use the equity premium instead of the default premium in the 
model estimated herein.  
 
As is evident from the regression results summarized in table 7, similar 
results are obtained using either long-term bond proxy. The betas for both 
government bond premia are significant and negative (-0.044 to -0.059), 
while that for the market premium is also significant, but positive (0.039 to 
0.044). This implies that E-REIT excess returns are negatively and positively 
related with term premia and equity premia, respectively. These results are 
robust to the choice of ordering of the orthogonalization. 
 
Table 7 presents some summary statistics for a two-factor-premium model 
for the monthly excess returns on the Canadian value-weighted index of E-
REITs. The factors are the monthly excess rates on long-term (Excess LT) or 
10-year (Excess 10-yr) government bonds (Gov. Bonds) and the monthly 
excess equity-market returns (Excess EMR). Excess returns are obtained by 
subtracting off the monthly Treasury bill rate. Either independent variable or 
factor is orthogonalized (Orth.) to remove the impact of the other factor. The 
definitions and the sources of the data for the various interest-rate series are 
as reported in table 5. “Reg.” refers to regression. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based 
on a t-test.  
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Table 7: Summary results for regressions of the excess returns on the 
value-weighted E-REIT index, based on a two-factor-premium 
model 
Independent Variables or Factors Estimated  Coefficient 
Reg. 







1  Excess LT Gov. 
Bonds  Orth. Excess EMR -0.0592
*** 0.0394
*** 0.2239 
2  Orth. Excess LT 
Gov. Bonds  Excess EMR   -0.0524
*** 0.0440
*** 0.2244 
3  Excess 10-yr  Orth. Excess EMR -0.0500
*** 0.0390
*** 0.2251 







Various aspects of the historical return performance of Canadian E-REITs 
were examined. Over the full period studied herein, the first-day abnormal 
returns of an average [typical] E-REIT are [in]significantly negative.   
Significant overpricing of average and typical E-REIT IPOs has corrected 
over time. No robust evidence exists for any abnormal returns during the 
first week to the first full year after issue, for the sample of Canadian E-
REITs examined herein. This finding is inconsistent with the buyer strategy 
prescribed in the extant literature (with the exception of Below, Zaman and 
McIntosh, 1995) – that investors should buy REIT IPO issues only after they 
begin trading.  This is especially inconsistent when one considers that trade 
costs are incurred with secondary market purchases, but not with purchases 
of an IPO issue.
16 This finding adds to the unresolved question: Why are 
IPOs in Canada correctly priced, while those in the U.S. are mis-priced? We 
provide some possible reasons why this is the case, but leave the testing of 
these possible reasons to future study. 
 
Secondary market investment in Canadian E-REITs, over the studied time 
period of 1996-2004, has generated considerably higher returns than for the 
S&P/TSX Composite with lower [higher] risk for a value- [equal-] weighted 
portfolio of E-REITs. Nevertheless, the Sharpe ratios, as measures of 
reward-to-variability, clearly indicate that both portfolio weightings of E-
REITs outperformed the S&P/TSX Composite over the studied period, and 
that the size-weighted index outperformed its equal-weighted counterpart. 
These results are robust, since the outperformance based on the Jensen 
alphas as measures of reward-to-systematic risk clearly indicate that both 
                                                 
16 For an approximation of the likely magnitude of the nonbroker-commission component of 
such trade costs, Kryzanowski, Lazrak and Rakita (2006a) report proportional quoted and 
effective half-spreads of 50 and 42 basis points for Canadian business trusts during the first six 
months of 2004. Performance of Canadian E-REITs  19 
portfolio weightings of E-REITs earned significantly positive alphas with the 
same performance ranking as they did with the Sharpe ratios for the two 
weightings of the E-REITs.  
 
However, caution should be exercised when basing future expectations on 
the secondary market performance of REITs over the studied period because 
the catalyst for the emergence of Canadian REITs was a liquidity crisis 
caused by rapidly declining asset values. Specifically, because of the sharp 
downturn in the value of North American property during the early 1990s, 
four Canadian open-end mutual fund trusts suspended redemptions during 
1993 due to acute deficiencies in liquidity caused by a marked decline in the 
marketability of their asset holdings (Scotton, 1993; White, 1994). Three of 
these entities (North American Real Fund, the Metfin Real Estate Growth 
Fund and the Counsel Real Estate Fund) were restructured as closed-end 
funds and listed on the TSX during 1993.
17  The fourth entity (MD Realty 
Fund) merged with the Canadian REIT (CREIT) in 1996.  
 
Not only are the E-REIT indices not highly-correlated with the S&P/TSX 
Composite but, also, these indexes display approximately one-half the 
systematic market risk of the S&P/TSX Composite, over the studied period. 
Therefore, if past history is a useful guide for predicting the future 
relationship between these two asset classes, then E-REITs offer valuable 
diversification benefits, with no sacrifice in return, if added to a portfolio of 
common stocks. 
 
As equity investments with greater fixed-income sensitivities, the returns of 
E-REITs are positively related to stock market returns and negatively related 
– with greater sensitivity than other equities – to interest rate changes. 
Furthermore, a greater portion of the variability of E-REIT returns is 
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17 They became Realfund REIT, Counsel REIT (later RioCan REIT) and Canadian REIT or 
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